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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH AT THE STATE COURT LEVEL 
SARAH ZWEERINK 
ABSTRACT 
A study in the effects of the solicitor general on judicial deference to the 
executive branch at the state court level. There has been significant research done into the 
development of judicial deference, but it almost always takes place at the Supreme Court. 
Similarly,  the Solicitor General’s success rate has only been analyzed at the federal level. 
Recently there has been a trend of states creating Solicitor General Offices in order to 
gain the advantage perceived at the federal level. By comparing the level of deference 
state courts give to their executive branch over two time periods I determine that although 
the Solicitor General does impact deference, the impact isn’t immediate. The states with 
the strongest level of deference were the states that have had Solicitor Generals for a 
significant amount of time before the analysis. States where the office was created I 
between the two time periods do experience heightened deference, but at a lower level. 
This paper seeks to fill the gap in judiciary research where the majority of the focus is on 
the Supreme Court, which although very important does not give a comprehensive 
understanding of the US judicial branch. 
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The relationship between the three branches of government, though central to US 
democracy, is rather precarious. Ensuring that no branch oversteps and that checks and 
balances are maintained is crucial to the stability of the relationship. The development of 
judicial deference to the executive branch may push against the current checks. When the 
judiciary allows executive preference to win in the courtroom, they are neglecting their 
responsibility to check executive power with their process of judicial review.  Courts hear 
thousands of cases a year about a vast field of topics judges are not experts in. So, it is 
fair to expect a certain level of deference, but it needs to be limited and deferential to the 
right people. Often deference comes in the form of amicus briefs. These are letters that 
are submitted to the court by experts, interest groups, or government agencies to petition 
the court. These briefs are used by judges to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
complex topics they may not have been familiar with prior to the case. Courts can also 
defer to other courts or committees with decision authority like medical boards. The court 
can remand a decision to these institutions if the court feels they are not as equipped to 
handle the case. So, given the sheer number of executive agencies and committees it 
makes sense for the judiciary to defer to the executive occasionally. However, at the top 
courts where they only hear high impact appeals, there is a lower quantity of cases. These 
courts should be less likely to defer cases to other’s authority and particularly in the 
broad fashion seen recently with judicial deference to the executive branch. Theories 
suggest that the Solicitor General plays a crucial role in the modern level of judicial 




branches. They are official hired by and serve under the executive branch, but most of 
their work in done in front of the judiciary. They are usually replaced every time the 
administration changes and use the OSG as a jumping off point for an upper level 
litigation or judicial career. At the federal level, the solicitor general’s office is in the 
Supreme Court’s building. The role of SG walks a fine line of loyalty to the executive 
and the judiciary. Given the number of cases the state is involved in at the highest 
appellate level, the SG is the most frequent party in the court. This repetition and 
familiarity gives the OSG a special relationship with the court. Theories postulate that the 
unique position of SG places them in a good role to illustrate and explore judicial 
deference to the executive branch. So the question arises, does the presence of the 
Solicitor General lead to a higher level of judicial deference? This question has been 
explored at the federal level, but the Supreme Court is not the whole of the judicial 
branch. They are the apex but it is made up of only nine justices compared to the 
thousand of judges that preside in the US. State courts hear and decide all but around 80 
cases a year heard in the US. If judicial deference to the executive branch is reaching a 
problematic level, it would be observed strongly in state courts. The problem with 
looking at state courts is they are highly understudied. There are very limited databases 
available and if one creates their own they must sort through hundreds of thousands of 
cases. This has discouraged the study of a critical piece of the US judiciary. This paper 
will hopefully begin to fill the gap. With the analysis of cases from 1995-1998 and 2010-
2013 I will look at the level of judicial deference to the executive, how it has changed, 





Development of Judicial Deference 
 Starting in the early 1900s with the development of strict scrutiny versus rational 
basis, the Supreme Court began to differentiate the depth of research and analysis 
required by a case. The case that introduced the idea that the Court could use different 
levels of scrutiny or testing was United States v. Carolene Products Co (1938). Carolene 
Products involves a 1923 act of Congress, The Filled Milk Act, which banned the 
interstate shipment of “filled milk”, which is a kind of skimmed milk, mixed with fat or 
oil. A milk manufacturer known as Carolene Products ended up being indicted under the 
act of Congress. The Court was given the task of determining whether or not the act was 
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. Congressional findings only supported the 
conclusion that filled milk was a problem when local retailers falsely labeled it but the 
entity itself was not harmful. All that was necessary of the Court was to ask whether or 
not the legislature had a rational basis for the imposed constraints that it was enforcing on 
market freedoms. From there, the Court would generally assume that if Congress could 
come up with a logically sound argument, then it would be next to impossible for the 
government to fail the rational basis test (Gillman, Graber and Whittington, 2014). 
 This new court theory was laid out in Footnote Four, which discussed where the 
Court should direct its energy,  
“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those 
of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within 




political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....Nor need I inquire whether 
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious... or 
nations... or racial minorities...: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry....” (Gillman, Graber and Whittington, 2014). 
From then on, strict scrutiny cases were for the more directly constitutional cases mostly 
focused around discrimination of a minority where the Supreme Court takes a very in 
depth and close look at the case. Contrasting with that, rational basis cases were more so 
decided on whether the accused party violated a law or precedent. The cases were not 
necessarily seen as is an act allowed or constitutional, but more so has the act violated 
past laws and decisions. This began to give the legislative and executive branch more 
leeway when it came to cases. As long as the executive branch could come up with a 
rational support, the Supreme Court would defer to them. 
This idea of judicial deference was expanded majorly in 1984 with the decision 
on the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. A case, which in 
turn, established what is now known as the Chevron Doctrine (Merrill, 1992). This case 
was a lawsuit that challenged the government’s interpretation of the word “source” in 
the Clean Air Act of 1963. In the majority opinion Justice John Stevens wrote  
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 




Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.” (Merrill, 1992)  
This “ambiguous” meaning that Stevens referenced has makes it extremely easy for the 
executive branch to define laws the way they want do. There is no specific definition or 
restraint on what is ambiguous so this doctrine has been used to allow the executive 
branch to interpret statutes and decisions in whatever way they can. Sometimes these 
interpretations can be significantly different than Congress’s original intent. It is 
expected for statutes to have a certain level of ambiguity and because of this Chevron 
has become the most cited case in administrative law disputes. The Supreme Court is 
deferring to executive branches desires and agenda instead of checking the power of the 
executive to circumvent legislative bodies. This doctrine and idea of judicial deference 
to the executive branch has continued to grow and solidify as precedent over the past 
years.  
Now, it is unreasonable to expect the courts to have a completely holistic and 
comprehensive understanding of every issue in every case, whereas the executive branch 
has many agencies with expertise in a vast variety of subjects. So it makes sense that the 
judiciary defers to their knowledge in some cases, but the question is how much 
deference is too much deference? When does this goes from a reasonable collaboration 
between the two branches to an overstep by the executive and a failure of the judicial to 




reasonable manner. They can remand cases to lower courts or other authoritative bodies. 
They can also request testimony or accept amicus briefs from experts (Nicholson, 
Collins, 2008). Courts deferring to others are not unprecedented or inherently harmful. 
However, when the deference is to the executive branch it must not undercut the courts 
responsibility to check their power. Institutions that may be giving executive agencies an 
unfair advantage in court should be evaluated. Deference is acceptable as long as it does 
not go too far. 
Theories about the Solicitor General 
So, where does the Solicitor General stand? Their position between the courts and 
the executive is unique, but is it problematic? The Solicitor General acts as the lawyer for 
the United States. They appear in court to support the administration. In addition to this, 
they decide which cases should be appealed and are in control of the amicus briefs filed. 
They are a critical link between the judicial and executive branch. It has been relatively 
well established that the Solicitor General has an advantage when it comes to appearing 
in front of the Supreme Court. With a nearly two-thirds success rate, they are far more 
likely to get their way that any other party (Black, Owens, 2012). But the exact reason 
why the advantage is so prevalent doesn’t have a clear answer. And the answer is 
important. Understanding why the OSG has an advantage in the Supreme Court will help 
in evaluating if their position facilitating deference is positive or negative. Perhaps their 
success is simply an indicator that the executive administrations across the country are 
passing constitutional laws with strong legislative support. However, given the level of 




that there are many possible explanations for the OSG’s success in the Supreme Court. 
There is no single theory or idea that political scientists have decided upon, but there are 
some smaller factors that contribute and two main overarching theories. 
Given the OSG is a direct part of the federal government there are some privileges 
the office has. Firstly is the sheer number of cases that handle. The vast level of cases the 
Solicitor General is responsible of means they have a greater number of options to 
appeal. The SG’s caseload spans all fifty states, which gives them the ability to appeal 
only the cases they feel they will win (Black, Owens, 2012, Lemos, 2009). They have all 
the cases from the federal courts that  amount to tens of thousands of cases a years. In 
comparison, although specific Supreme Court lawyers are slowly gaining popularity, no 
single practice can match the sheer number of case options the Solicitor General’s office 
has. According to the Supreme Court database, the US Federal Government is the 
number one petitioner in Supreme Court history and is second only to the combination of 
all fifty states governments as respondent. Neither fact is surprising, but perhaps there is 
simply a selection bias that is giving the Solicitor their apparent edge. Though this 
phenomenon does play into the Solicitor’s success rate, it does not explain the whole 
picture. Anyone who does appeal to the Supreme Court likely feels like they can win. 
The limited cases the SC hears along with the high amount of resources, financial and 
otherwise, required to gain a SC writ of certiorari deter wasteful petitions. But, even 
individual states have a much smaller pool of case to choose from, much small 
organizations or individuals (Songer, 1995). Yes, all groups appeal the cases they think 




cases. But, selection bias still affects every person appealing to the court. Additionally, 
the Solicitor General’s office can handle a significantly larger amount of appeals than the 
average law office and therefore also lead the Supreme Court in appeals submitted. Also, 
the selection bias only applies to cases where the US Government is a petitioner. When 
they are the respondent they have no say in whether the case is appealed or accepted by 
the Supreme Court. They must appear if called. The Solicitor General’s win rate is lower 
as a respondent than as a petitioner, but it is still significantly higher than any other 
participant. The OSG does have a selection advantage, but not one big enough to explain 
a two-thirds success rate.  
Another factor that contributes to OSG’s success is its funding and governmental 
position. It with he vast number of cases also comes with a vast amount of 
resources (Waxman, 1998). As a part of the federal government, the OSG is publically 
funded. They don’t have to consider high legal fees in the same way other parties would 
have to. The office also doesn’t fully internalize legal fee payments or other damage 
payments. The public taxpayers have that burden so the SG has more resources to devote 
to preparation and other legal priorities. Though loses may not come with the dame 
financial cost, there is a political cost the executive branch risks that other organizations 
usually don’t have to. The ability to focus finances and other resources in a freer way 
than other law office also gives the SG an advantage in the Supreme Court. Once again, 






Tenth Justice Theory 
Outside of more concrete variables like caseload and resources, there are two 
major theories as to why the Solicitor General is more successful in the courtroom than 
other participants. The first one is known as the “Tenth Justice” theory. This is 
historically the more well-known and trusted theory although all research into this 
phenomenon is relatively recent. Caplan’s Tenth Justice theory was the predominant 
perspective for some time as it logical and was one of the first valid explanations of the 
Solicitor General’s success. Caplan argues that the SG operates relatively independently 
from the President and Attorney General (Caplan 1988). To him the Court sees the SG as 
a trusted fact broker. Someone who will advise them in an unbiased way and whose 
opinion they can follow without the need for much substantiation. That although they are 
arguing for one specific side, the facts they present are more neutral than manipulated for 
their own success. Initially, this theory can come across as naive. Why would an agent of 
the executive branch more directly serve the judicial branch? This implies the President 
never tries to push their ideology on the Court and that the Court is legalistic entity that 
only cares about the facts of a case. However, the theory holds a lot more water than it’s 
initial impression may indicate. The SG has a very unique standing compared to other 
others. Until relatively recently it was one of the only repeat actors in the Supreme Court 
(Epstein, Posner 2018). This means they need to maintain a reputation of reasonability 
and reliability. Underhanded or aggressive presentation tactics may be helpful in the short 
run, but over time it deteriorates the relationship and only makes the SG’s job more 




that they rely on in the Court. With that comes the recognition that trust between agencies 
of different branches is very tenuous. The SG must be constantly respecting the trust the 
SC has in them to preserve the relational benefits. Paralleled, the SG is also uniquely 
aware of the Court, understanding “their latest concerns and inevitable cross-currents 
between otherwise seemingly unrelated cases”, and this would be lost if the SG ruined 
their relationship with the Justices (Epstein, Posner 2018). The repeated interactions both 
inside and outside the courtroom help the OSG learn what is important to the court. They 
know the priorities, which arguments are most effective, and what points each justice 
dislikes. Though other lawyers can study the justices and court overall, hands on and in 
person experiences can give an edge. This is all incentive for the SG to remain 
trustworthy and loyal to the court. They gain a lot from a positive relationship with the 
judiciary and it is in their best interests to maintain it even if that requires smaller 
ideological or agenda sacrifices.  
Additionally, the executive hires the SG, but unconditionally supporting 
everything the administration wants is usually not in the SGs best interests. Though the 
SG serves under the executive branch, it is not a long-term position and most use this 
position as a jumping off point for their career (Segal, Reedy 1988). Most executives 
have multiple over the course of their time in office, and never has an SG served under 
multiple Presidents or governors. However given its high status in both the legal and 
political fields working as the SG can lead to high quality opportunities in both fields. 
Because of this, developing good relationships and a successful track record is very 




the key reason the office of the solicitor general has such a high success rate. The Court 
has reason to believe the SG’s “professional goals will be more in line with the Court’s 
institutional focus than the goals of private attorney who more closely follow the 
directions of their principles” (Black, Owens 2012). Given these concerns, it is very 
reasonable to understand that the SG has a higher incentive to endear itself to the Court 
and maintain a successful and trustworthy reputation. Also, within the OSG there is the 
SG who is appointed by the head of the executive branch, but there are also four 
assistants to the solicitor general that are hired. Though it varies state to state, at the 
federal level three of them as politically neutral. They are civil servants and only one 
assistant (known as the Solicitor General’s political advisor) is politically affiliated. So, 
to serve and advise in the OSG one does not necessarily agree with or need to support the 
current administration (Waxman 1998). Because of this, the justice will view the SG as 
more neutral than the other litigants and are more likely to believe the facts presented by 
the Solicitor General regardless of whether the justice particularly likes or agrees with the 
SG’s overall argument.  
Because of this unique standing the SG has, the justice are more likely to defer to 
the SG’s expertise or arguments (Caplan 1988, Black, Owens 2012). Though the 
Supreme Court hears highly limited cases and does research each case, there is only so 
much time and expertise a justice can have. They may have the ability to research and 
form a well-founded opinion on a topic, but at the end of the day they are legal scholars 
and each case is so nuanced that for them to have a comprehensive understanding of 




and experience of others. This is the whole point behind amicus briefs. It is the chance for 
someone who knows the subject of the case better than the legal participants to give of 
their knowledge to assist the Court. So if the justices believe that they can rely on the SG 
to be neutral than they are far more willing to defer to the Solicitor’s arguments and 
perspectives. If OSG can present findings and facts that the Supreme Court justices may 
take at face value because they trust the SG and do not have their own contradicting 
knowledge. 
A major support of this theory of deference is the existence of CVSG or Call for 
the View of the Solicitor General. Although anyone can submit an amicus brief, the SG is 
the only party where the Supreme Court will specifically request their input on a 
case (Nicholson, Collins 2008). This process is used with relatively high frequency and 
illustrates the faith the justices have in the Solicitor General as an informant and the 
importance the office of the solicitor general holds in the eyes of the court. On a singular 
Supreme Court case, hundreds of amici can be filed. These often come from experts and 
interests groups will highly technical knowledge. So, for the justices to see those and still 
request the opinion of a law agency under the executive branch shows a unprecedentedly 
high level of trust. Though, technically anyone can file an amicus brief as long as they are 
willingly to file them properly through the Supreme Court’s website. The process is 
relatively simple considering the red tape that normally plagues governmental agencies. 
Additionally, it’d be reasonable to assume there would be credential requirements to file 
documents to the countries highest court. But no, absolutely anyone who wants to can file 




trust the information within these briefs as much as they can the information from a 
CVSG.  
So, though it may seem a bit odd for a position appointed by the executive branch 
to serve such a critical role in the judiciary, it is important to understand why the Solicitor 
General is motivated to maintain the unique relationship they have with the Supreme 
Court. They act as a connector between the two branches and even have their main office 
in the Supreme Court building. By pursuing long term trust and goals, Caplan would 
argue that the SG, by helping advise the court, put themselves in a position where they 
are constantly granted deference by individual justices and the Supreme Court overall.  
Separation of Powers Theory 
In more recent years, other theories about the Solicitor General’s success have 
sprung op and challenged the dominance of the Tenth Justice theory. The main concern 
that other theories seek to remedy is the fact that for the SG to be concerned about 
advancing the interests of the Court would likely conflict with their job to represent the 
President and executive branch (Black, Owens 2011). At the end of the day they are hired 
by the President and can be replaced relatively easily considering the prestige of the 
position. The President or governor is not necessarily micromanaging every step the SG 
makes, but “the availability of some independence from the administration does not 
remove the SG from the executive branch” (Fisher 1990). The SG still has plenty of 
oversight by the Attorney General, Justice Department, and many other committees and 
agencies. So, though they may have independence to argue and advocate cases as they 




they are risking their job. They may be able to occasionally sacrifice a case or specific 
argument to maintain the judicial relationships, but if this is constant than it will 
definitely be noticed by their higher ups. The most viable challenge to the Tenth Justice 
Theory is called the Separation of Powers Theory. This perspective sees the SG as direct 
extension of the executive branch. The SG appears in Court with the main goal of 
accomplishing the executive branch’s agenda. Though judicial relations may concern 
them, it is not a priority. They will play nice with the court only when is helps or at the 
very least does not harm the pursuit of the administrations agenda. A lot of interviews of 
nominees or past SG’s have backed this opinion. In 1986, the current SG admitted that if 
the Attorney General “concludes that the judgment that his Solicitor General has given 
him is a judgment with which he does not concur, and in that event, he has the clear 
statutory authority to direct the Solicitor General to take a contrary position” (Fisher 
1990). The President or higher officials of the executive branch can control the SG 
without even threatening replacement. The SG is under the authority of many groups and 
though they may be able to operate with freedom; that is only until their actions flag the 
concern of their superiors. 
It is also important to note that because the President or governor appoints the SG 
they likely have similar ideologies. The SG represents the US in the highest national 
court, so there is high incentive for the executive to appoint someone he can trust to 
choose similar positions to what they would choose themself. If the SG is a direct 
extension of the President than I could then conclude the advantage they receive in Court 




is the key claim of the separation of powers theory. In this theory, the Solicitor General is 
just an indicator of executive preference and the office itself does not affect the level of 
deference. The idea is that judicial deference to the executive has simply increased 
overtime because the precedent of that strategy increases every time the court confirms 
it. As the Chevron Doctrine has been utilized successfully by the SG in court, the 
precedent for judicial deference to the executive grows stronger and more prominent. 
This turns into a cycle and judicial deference will continue to increase exponentially. The 
SG is also a clear and direct indicator of executive preference. At the federal level, before 
the OSG was created different committees and solicitors handled the tasks. There was the 
Attorney General, the Solicitor of the Treasury, the Court of Claims, and most 
departments had their own legal officials (Clayton 2009). The consolidation of these 
responsibilities of one office appointed directly by the President and answering to the 
Attorney General helped clarify the Presidents agenda in court. Now combined into one 
office, this theory postulates that the SG is a direct signal of executive desires and as 
makes increased deference to the executive easier (Black, Owens 2011). If the judges can 
discern what the President wants clearly, they can more quickly support his agenda. As 
explained previously, the court does not have time to comprehensively become experts 
on the nuances of every issue within every case. So, one strategy available to the justices 
is to defer to the executive branch that has a variety of agencies with pertinent expertise. 
Because of this, the Court feels it is sometimes appropriate to defer decisions and power 
to the President and the executive offices and this is the driver behind SG litigation 




SG in order to show deference to the executive branch, they are in a sense illustrating that 
they don’t see the SG as neutral and that the SG themselves is not what influences the 
level of deference.  
There has been no clear resolution between the two theories within political 
scientist, and likely it is a combination of the two. The Solicitor General is an agent of the 
executive branch and must support the President’s agenda. If not they can be controlled 
by the Attorney General or even replaced. Other the other hand, the executive branch 
likely realizes the importance of the OSG’s relationship with the courts and is willing to 
allow for its preservation. On the other side, the judiciary likely see the SG as an 
extension of the executive. That’s who hires them and that’s whom they appear in court 
to represent. But, judges also know the SG has freedom to litigate to a certain extent. 
They know that professionalism and trust is a priority to the SG; therefore judges feel 
more comfortable trusting in and relying on the SG’s findings and opinions. In respect to 
deference it is the same. The legal establishment of the Chevron Doctrine and by 
extension the precedent of judicial deference to the executive plays a role in the 
increasing level of deference. However, the relationship between the court and the SG 
also plays a role. The Solicitor General likely increasing deference through its signaling 
relationship with the executive and its trust-based relationship with the judiciary. 
State Courts and the Solicitor General  
Both of these theories have developed off of Supreme Court study. In fact, the 
vast majority of judiciary study has taken been done on the Supreme Court. Most of the 




rest of the judiciary. There are a variety of reasons for this, but the foremost is data 
access. The Supreme Court has a consolidated, easily accessible website with every case. 
There are search forms that allow you to filter cases by a multitude of options including, 
but not limited to, justices, parties, ideological outcome, and case topic. The Supreme 
Court is also well talked about in the media. It is featured in opinion polls and has a well-
documented history of the court, its justices, and its decisions. The significance of the 
Supreme Court affects every American citizen. On the other side, a citizen living in 
California is unlikely to care about proceedings in Massachusetts unless the case is 
expected to go to the Supreme Court or otherwise have a nationwide effect. State courts 
are required to publish their cases, but the way this often happens poses problems for 
research. Often times these cases are simply published to a state website or another 
consolidated legal site like Lexis Nexis. But although all the cases are available, they are 
not easily searchable or sorted into databases that make extraction for analysis. So, unless 
one can utilize a database created by a previous researcher, one would need to sort 
through hundreds of thousands of court cases to even separate the ones for analysis. The 
number of cases compounds this issue. Even State Supreme Courts hear hundreds of 
cases a year compared to the eighty the Federal Supreme Court hears.  
State courts are also not uniform. The reason many study the Federal Supreme 
Courts is its structure hasn’t significantly changed. How justices act or make decisions 
may have changed, but the court itself is consistent. State courts are not. Most have 
remained consistent within their state, but any cross-state comparison will encounter 




it doesn’t hear many cases and is not the Highest Court in the state. The highest Texas 
court is the Court of Appeals. Other states like Oklahoma have a high court for criminal 
cases and another for civil cases and there is no consolidated upper court. Within each 
state there is nuanced differences for each State Highest Court. One major example is 
how judges are elected. Some are governor appointed like the SC and others hold partisan 
elections. Some SHC have seven members who hear every case and some may have five 
but only a panel of three is assigned each case. A big distinction between the SC and 
SHC is some SHC have a mandatory retirement age (normally seventy two). These 
differences create boundaries to study state courts, whose difficulties are only 
compounded as one tries to explore even lower district courts for example. Because of 
this, a vast majority of judicial study focuses on the Supreme Court or how certain parties 
behave at the Supreme Court.  
But, the judiciary is not just the Supreme Court. Though it is the country’s overall 
court of last resort, its limited docket means that for the vast majority of cases, the state 
courts will make the final decision. SC cases, because of the discretion, tend to be cases 
of high national importance. It is understandable why the SC is studied more as it is the 
court with the greatest impact on the US. Even if it dominates the field, sole study of the 
SC is not sufficient. Supreme Court does not provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the US judiciary and precedent does trickle down to state courts, so it is important to see 
if this SC trends extend to the state courts as well (Brace, GannHall 1995, Layton 2001). 
In reference to judicial deference, the SC would be deferring perhaps more influential 




judicial deference to the executive branch phenomena would directly impact a huge 
number of Americans and could end up making a huge impact on policy across 
America. However, there has been extremely little research done on state courts and their 
relationship with the other branches of state government. But, if the interaction between 
state solicitor generals and state courts follows the same patterns as the interaction 
between the federal SG and the Supreme Court, then judicial deference is an extremely 
influential phenomena and should not be taken lightly until further research is done into 
the long term impact of judicial deference to the executive branch.  
In regards to how the two main theories of deference at the federal, there is reason 
to believe the theories would translate. Firstly, all states are bound by the precedent set by 
the SC. They are required to abide by the constitution and federal statutes that are 
constitutional. This includes following Supreme Court decisions on the constitutional 
validity of acts and laws. There have also been studies that indicate although state courts 
are trying to reduce federal interference, they are mirroring federal courts actions and 
rulings (O’Connor 1981). The Solicitor General has maintained an advantage in front of 
the Supreme Court and many state executive offices wanted to see that same effect for 
their benefit (Layton 2001). It tracks that if state courts are mirroring the federal courts, 
then state executives would try to gain any perceived advantages federal executives have 
in the SC. Regardless of the reason the SG garners more success and judicial deference, 
the success encourages state executives and legislatures to create an OSG. These offices 
were created in what is known as three waves (Miller 2010). The first wave generally 




deference had a high prominence even in the federal courts. Yes, the Chevron Doctrine 
had been passed at this point, but it was only six years prior and the precedent of the 
judiciary deferring to the executive branch had not been solidified as a reliable 
expectation. So for the most part offices created pre 1990 were created to handle the 
overwhelming number of cases a state judiciary was required to keep track of (Miller 
2010). They still handled the same responsibilities as the federal SG, but were created by 
the Attorney General as a way to pass off some work and make their own job more 
manageable. Unfortunately, to create a Solicitor General’s office is not a very 
complicated procedure and does not require any type of statue nor does it need to pass 
through the legislature. Because of this, it is difficult to nail down exact dates of when the 
offices were created as well as why the office was created. This general theory behind the 
first wave of state solicitor generals is mostly based on press statements and news 
interviews where the Attorney General or Justice Department was asked directly what the 
point of the SG was. As courts evolved so di the role of these SGs. Any offices 
established before 1980 were very different from the current definition of the solicitor 
general. But, as time progressed these responsibilities shifted into as office much more 
reflective of the federal solicitor general. Though these offices were mostly designed to 
handle the caseload and responsibilities of the Attorney General, they began to garner the 
same advantages of the federal solicitor general at the Supreme Court (Layton 2001). 
Unfortunately there has been little research done on whether these OSG also gained the 
aforementioned advantages at the state court level, but is would not be surprising as state 




The second wave of SG office creation refers to those states that founded an SG 
office in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This is right around the time that Supreme Court 
cases involving judicial deference are arising and executives are starting to try to take 
advantage of the precedent. The third wave follows shortly after, around 2007 when 
executive offices observed the success of other state’s solicitor generals and may more 
created their own (Miller 2010, Owens, Wolforth 2014). The little research that has 
looked at state solicitor generals has not found a significant difference in the motivation 
or results between the second and third wave of OSG creation. Due to this, these two 
waves will be treated as one in the study. Most of this research was also done in the early 
2000s and 2010 so they completely exclude offices created after around 2010. These 
offices created very recently will serve as the third wave or category when I look at how 
the creation of an OSG affects judicial deference to the executive branch. It is assumed 
that executives and legislatures that participated in the second and third waves of creation 
did so most prominently to gain the perceived advantage other state and federal SGs had 
in court. As of 2019 when Kentucky becomes the most recent state to create an SG 
office, forty-four of the fifty-one states have a solicitor general’s office. Due to the 
previously mention lack of study of the solicitor general and state courts overall though 
states perceived a deferential benefit to creating an SG office, I don’t know if their 
perception is a reality. Research has looked at state solicitor general’s arguments in front 
of federal court, but there has been no research on the state solicitor general in state 
courts. When the state SG is present in front of the Supreme Court, research has seen 




Layton 2001, Songer 1995). The frequency of deference and general success is not quite 
as high with state SG as it is with the federal SG, but that is usually attributed to the fact 
that a state SG appears significantly less than the federal SG (Miller 2010). Despite this, 
many researchers have attributed the same theories of explanation (Tenth Justice, 
Separation of Powers) to the state SG in federal court as they do to the federal SG (Brace, 
GannHall 1995, Owens, Wolforth 2014). This study will look at if this trend continues 
when the state solicitor general operates in state court.  
Methods: Measuring Judicial Deference 
In order to see whether the presence of the Solicitor General increases judicial 
deference to the executive branch I will use only basic test measure and compare the 
results across different scenarios. I will be looking at how often a court or specific judge 
will go against their traditional ideological leanings to side with whatever position the 
government is advocating for. As an example, in the Supreme Court I would look at how 
often Ruth Badger Ginsburg voted for a conservative decision supported by the Solicitor 
General and President. Looking exclusively at the votes judges cast when they are 
ideologically at odds with the executive branch will isolate deference as a voting 
motivation from the variety of other factors that may influence a judge’s vote. For 
example, if all judges were observed, not just ones on the other side of the ideological 
aisle compared to the executive, then ideological agreement is far more likely to have 
influenced a judges vote than deference. It is possible that a conservative judge would 
cast a conservative vote because the conservative outcome is what the governor wanted, 




be that they ideologically agreed with that particular outcome. I are only looking at 
judges that would, without executive influence, vote against the governments’ preference. 
So, when they choose to vote for the executive preference over their own I can observe 
that as judicial deference to the executive branch. There are two datasets that the data will 
be pulled from, both from different time periods. The first is state court decisions from 
1995-1998 (Ganhall database) and the second is decisions from 2010-2013 (Nexis Uni 
Cases). Though there are not huge amounts of time between the two datasets, they 
represent the first and third wave of state solicitor general creation. The decisions by each 
state’s highest court and the individual judges on the panel have been collected and will 
be analyzed for deference level change between the two datasets. The data will be tested 
across a variety of state courts, and then comparing different situations, years, and 
structures I will be able to determine if the Solicitor General effects judicial deference to 
the executive branch at the state level and hopefully where that effect is more or less 
influential.  Specifically, I will be addressing three different hypotheses on where judicial 
deference is effective.  
Methods: Hypotheses and Test Results 
Hypothesis One: The creation of an OSG will increase the level of judicial deference 
given to the executive.  
This is the main hypothesis of the paper and the following four will look at limits 
and boundaries of the effect the OSG has on judicial deference to the executive branch. 
This test will look at how the level of judicial deference in states with or without an SG 




based of when they developed an OSG. There have been states with solicitor general's 
offices created at the beginning of the twentieth century even before the idea of judicial 
deference to the executive was popular or had strong precedent. They also represent a set 
of data from a time before the Chevron Doctrine where judicial deference was given a 
directly legal reasoning and precedent. However, most of these offices operated very 
differently to the federal template of an OSG. They were more like assistants to the AG. 
They did not serve in court and did not have the relationship with the judges that the 
modern office does. After the Chevron doctrine, many of these older offices were 
converted and changed their purpose into one more reflective of the federal SG. These 
converted offices along with OSGs established before 1998 will constitute the first 
category for comparison. These states have had OSGs for all of the cases I consider. 
These will provide data on the first wave of OSGs that occurred right after the legal 
establishment of judicial deference. The second category will cover the second and third 
wave of creation that spanned the late 90s and early 2000s respectively. These offices 
were created in between 1998 and 2013. These states did not have OSGs during the cases 
that make up the Gannhall dataset, but do have OSGs in the cases consolidated from 
Nexis Uni. This is around the time that judicial deference had solidly established 
precedent and was becoming a more prominent political pursuit. Executive branch 
politicians were now actively pursuing ways to utilize the potential judicial benefits. The 
third category is states that for the purpose of the analysis have never had an OSG. These 
include states that still don’t have one, or states that created the office after 2013. These 




establish a base level of judicial deference to the executive branch that is expected 
without the OSG. When this is compared to the other two groups then I can see if this 
base rate is lower than the rate of deference received by the executive when an SG is 
present in court.  See Appendix A for states in each category. 
Before conducting the test, it was important to separate the case decisions into 
two groups and six subgroups. The two main groups are cases where the state was a 
petitioner versus cases where the state was a defendant. The main reason for this 
distinction is to avoid selection bias in the results. The modern OSG is responsible for 
determining, which cases the state appeals and how far each appeal should be taken. 
Given the limited resources of any governmental office and the mass amount of cases 
each year where the state is a party, the OSG must use great discretion when appealing 
cases. Because of this delicate balancing act the SG must consider, they likely only 
pursue cases they expect to win and are important to the executive agenda. They will only 
want to put time and resources in cases that will successfully impact the office and 
administration. So, there is a selection bias concern when the state is the petitioner in a 
case. Judicial deference may be the reason the OSG feels they would win, but it also 
could be driven by other factors. This is why there is a separation of cases into State 
Petitioner and State Defendant. When the state is a defendant in a case, the other party is 
who chose to appeal the decision. The OSG has no say in whether they appear or put 
resources into the case or not. This removes the possibility of a selection bias and allows 
for comparison between the two. Within each category there is also a consideration to 




dissent. For a judge to dissent both against their colleagues and normal ideological voting 
patterns would require a high level of deference. For the most part, the analysis will focus 
on the consolidation of the three, but the distinction is rather interesting may be viable for 
future research. Quite a few states have very singular decisions - meaning that less than 
ten percent of cases have a dissent or concurrence. Because of this there is too much 
variation across states for deferential dissents or concurrence to be statistically significant 
in this project.  
Taking into account the two groups, I will run two t-tests after consolidating the 
cases for each state. One test compares cases where the state was a petitioner in 1995-
1998 versus 2010-2013. The second test concerns cases where the state is a defendant to 
determine if the mean deference level was significant. Each of the three categories of 
OSG creation will be tested and then compared to ultimately evaluate the truth of 













State	 Pet	Def.	A	 Pet	Def.	B	 Change	 State	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	
Arizona	 0.471	 0.166	 -0.304	 Arizona	 0.0476	 0.669	 0.622	
Colorado	 0.452	 0.808	 0.355	 Colorado	 0.035	 0.667	 0.631	
Delaware	 0.222	 1	 0.778	 Delaware	 0.575	 0.816	 0.240	
Illinois	 0.277	 ER	 	 Illinois	 0.361	 ER	 	
Maine	 NA	 ER	 	 Maine	 NA	 ER	 	
Michigan	 0.51	 ER	 	 Michigan	 0	 ER	 	
Minnesota	 0.351	 ER	 	 Minnesota	 0.247	 ER	 	
Missouri	 0.389	 0.576	 0.187	 Missouri	 0.504	 0.737	 0.233	
New	York	 0.595	 ER	 	 New	York	 0.148	 ER	 	
Ohio	 0.187	 ER	 	 Ohio	 0.6	 ER	 	
Oregon	 0.532	 0.2	 -0.332	 Oregon	 0.283	 0.545	 0.262	
South	Carolina	 0.334	 0.388	 0.0537	 South	Carolina	 0.248	 0.677	 0.429	
Tennessee	 0.407	 0.795	 0.388	 Tennessee	 0.827	 0.545	 -0.282	
Utah		 0.271	 0.667	 0.396	 Utah		 0.451	 0.594	 0.143	
Vermont	 0.235	 0.667	 0.432	 Vermont	 0.255	 0.719	 0.464	
Washington	 0.439	 0.714	 0.275	 Washington	 0.349	 0.647	 0.298	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 0.378***	 0.598***	 0.223***	 Mean	 0.329***	 0.662***	 0.304***	
Table 1: Change in deference from 95-98 to 10-13 in category 1 (Before ‘98)                     















State	 Pet	Def.	A	 Pet	Def.	B	 Change	 State2	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change3	
Alabama	 0.752	 0.571	 -0.180	 Alabama	 0.536	 0.500	 -0.036	
Alaska		 0.408	 0.412	 0.003	 Alaska		 0.505	 0.709	 0.204	
California	 0.400	 0.700	 0.300	 California	 0.333	 0.041	 -0.293	
Connecticut	 0.411	 ER	 	 Connecticut	 0.318	 ER	 	
Florida	 0.114	 0.462	 0.348	 Florida	 0.273	 0.776	 0.503	
Georgia	 NA	 ER	 	 Georgia	 NA	 ER	 	
Hawaii	 NA	 0.722	 	 Hawaii	 NA	 0.493	 	
Indiana	 0.447	 0.480	 0.033	 Indiana	 0.593	 0.640	 0.047	
Kansas	 0.302	 ER	 	 Kansas	 0.230	 ER	 	
Maryland	 NA	 ER	 	 Maryland	 NA	 ER	 	
Massachusetts	 0.250	 ER	 	 Massachusetts	 0.497	 ER	 	
Montana	 0.342	 ER	 	 Montana	 0.293	 ER	 	
Nebraska	 0.354	 0.552	 0.198	 Nebraska	 0.336	 0.669	 0.332	
Nevada	 0.539	 0.472	 -0.068	 Nevada	 0.489	 0.904	 0.415	
New	Jersey	 0.529	 0.551	 0.022	 New	Jersey	 0.196	 0.586	 0.389	
North	Carolina	 0.196	 0.776	 0.579	 North	Carolina	 0.348	 0.778	 0.430	
North	Dakota	 0.237	 0.520	 0.283	 North	Dakota	 0.198	 0.848	 0.650	
Oklahoma	 0.590	 0.351	 -0.239	 Oklahoma	 0.528	 0.295	 -0.233	
Texas	 0.289	 0.500	 0.211	 Texas	 0.453	 0.519	 0.066	
Virginia	 0.409	 0.741	 0.332	 Virginia	 0.519	 0.726	 0.208	
West	Virginia	 0.324	 0.000	 -0.324	 West	Virginia	 0.382	 0.788	 0.406	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 0.383**	 0.521**	 0.107**	 	 0.391***	 0.618***	 0.221***	
Table 2: Change in deference from 95-98 to 10-13 in category 2 (Between ‘98 and ‘10) 












State	 Pet	Def.	A	 Pet	Def.	B	 Change	 State2	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change3	
Arkansas	 0.537	 NA	 	 Arkansas	 0.606	 NA	 	
Idaho	 0.204	 0.458	 0.254	 Idaho	 0.371	 0.833	 0.462	
Iowa	 0.241	 ER	 	 Iowa	 0.676	 ER	 	
Kentucky	 NA	 ER	 	 Kentucky	 NA	 ER	 	
Louisiana	 0.531	 0.667	 0.136	 Louisiana	 0.329	 0.556	 0.227	
Mississippi	 0.310	 ER	 	 Mississippi	 0.025	 ER	 	
New	Hampshire	 0.189	 NA	 	 New	Hampshire	 0.253	 NA	 	
New	Mexico	 0.327	 0.569	 0.243	 New	Mexico	 0.326	 0.468	 0.142	
Pennsylvania	 0.198	 0.677	 0.479	 Pennsylvania	 0.531	 0.537	 0.006	
Rhode	Island	 0.260	 1.000	 0.740	 Rhode	Island	 0.422	 0.884	 0.462	
South	Dakota	 0.162	 NA	 	 South	Dakota	 0.344	 NA	 	
Wisconsin	 0.583	 0.504	 -0.078	 Wisconsin	 0.389	 0.357	 -0.032	
Wyoming	 0.333	 0.588	 0.255	 Wyoming	 0.845	 0.766	 -0.079	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 0.323***	 0.426***	 0.289***	 Mean	 0.638*	 0.629*	 0.169*	
Table 3: Change in deference from 95-98 to 10-13 in category 3 (After ’13 or no OSG) 
*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, I compare the change in the means across each category. 
States with OSGs before 1998 have the highest level of change for both when the state is 
the petitioner and respondent (22.3% and 30.4% respectively). These numbers are about 
ten percent higher than states that created the OSG in between 1998 and 2010. These 
states had a mean deference increase of 10.7% with state petitioners and 22.1% with state 
respondents. Originally, it was expected that category 2 where the OSG was created in 
between the time periods would experience a higher change in deference. There may 
have been higher deference percentage wise with category 1, but the change should have 
been higher in category 2. So results seem to indicate that the creation of a solicitor 
general does not affect the level of judicial deference. However, the timing may come 
into play. As mentioned earlier, these time periods are very close together. An institution 




category 1 states, ten  of them had OSG offices created after 1990. That means there is 
five to eight years of having a solicitor general present. Eight of the states in category 2 
are also within five to eight years of the 2010-2013 data. This may not be enough time to 
observe the effect an SG can have on deference. It will take some time for the office itself 
to establish routines and processes for the state. Then afterwards it will take some for the 
court and the OSG to develop a relationship that encourages judicial deference. The OSG 
must prove that they are providing trustworthy information and arguments that the court 
can defer to. This also may be the amount of time it takes for there to be turnover within 
the court. Perhaps judges that were used to operating without a SG will be more resistant 
to deferring to one so quickly after its establishment. So although the data cannot show 
beyond a doubt that the creation of a Solicitor General will increase deference, it does 
show that states with an SG have a higher level of deference when the state is a defendant 
(no selection bias). It also indicates that the longer the SG has been around the greater 
deference they receive (30.4% from category 1, 22.1% from category 2, and 16.9% from 
category 3). It may not be the creation of the OSG that increases deference, but the 
establishment of the institution as a critical piece of the court processes. 
Hypothesis Two: Individual Justices that span both time periods will follow similar 
trends of deference as that to the overall court 
*Modified: Individual Justices will have lower levels of deference as they are less 
likely to adjust to the institutional creation of an OSG 
 Originally, hypothesis two held an expectation that individuals follow the same 




all approach the court from a different perspective. There are stricter judges that believe 
laws are meant to be read literally with minimal expansion. Then there are judges on the 
opposite side that see the Constitution and other statutes as living documents that is open 
for progress, changes, and reform. So, more likely would be a mean deference change 
similar to the states, but a greater level of individual variance. Given the results from the 
previous hypothesis, this test has been slightly amended. It will still look at whether 
judges mirror the overall court, but also explore whether judges that were present before 
the creation of the OSG are less likely to adjust and be deferential. Those justices serving 
in states from category 2 have been bolded to indicate they apply to the modifies 
hypothesis as well. 
Judge	Pet	 Pet	Def.	A	 Pet	Def.	B	 Change	Pet	 Judge	Res	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	Res	
Randy	Holland	 0.250	 1.000	 0.750	 Randy	Holland	 0.653	 0.816	 0.163	
Elizabeth	Weaver	 0.230	 ER	 	 Elizabeth	Weaver	 0.000	 ER	 	
Marilyn	Kelly	 0.530	 ER	 	 Marilyn	Kelly	 0.000	 ER	 	
Michael	Cavanaugh	 0.550	 ER	 	 Michael	Cavanaugh	 0.000	 ER	 	
Alan	Page	 0.374	 ER	 	 Alan	Page	 0.238	 ER	 	
William	Price	 0.372	 0.536	 0.164	 William	Price	 0.554	 0.735	 0.181	
Patricia	Serna	 0.300	 0.250	 -0.050	 Patricia	Serna	 0.300	 0.500	 0.200	
Gerald	VandeWalle	 0.520	 0.251	 -0.269	 Gerald	VandeWalle	 0.848	 0.195	 -0.652	
Joseph	Watt	 0.586	 0.524	 -0.062	 Joseph	Watt	 0.129	 0.333	 0.205	
Yvonne	Krauger	 0.684	 0.525	 -0.159	 Yvonne	Krauger	 0.149	 0.231	 0.082	
Michael	Gillette	 0.200	 0.532	 0.332	 Michael	Gillette	 0.545	 0.283	 -0.262	
Joan	Toal	 0.299	 0.591	 0.292	 Joan	Toal	 0.223	 0.734	 0.511	
Adolpho	Birch	 0.419	 ER	 	 Adolpho	Birch	 0.633	 ER	 	
Christine	Durham	 0.216	 0.667	 0.450	 Christine	Durham	 0.462	 0.594	 0.133	
Barbara	Keenan	 0.393	 0.000	 -0.393	 Barbara	Keenan	 0.510	 0.750	 0.240	
Leroy	Hassell	 0.462	 0.000	 -0.462	 Leroy	Hassell	 0.533	 0.732	 0.199	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 0.052	 0.398	 -0.037	 Mean	 0.393	 0.479	 0.061	
Table 4: Change in deference from 95-98 to 10-13 in individual judges 




These result for the most part support the modified thesis, but not the original 
postulation. The mean change in deference is 6.1%, which is significantly lower than that 
of courts in either category 1 or 2 states. This indicates that the individual judges are not 
following the courts overall trends. In fact the individual differences are all over the 
place. Some of the category 2 judges have very high deference (Barbara Keenan: 24%) 
while others have extremely low deference change (Gerald VandeWalle: - 65.2%). 
Category 1 state judges are similarly scattered ranging from a -26.2% to a 51.1% 
deference change. Two things to keep in mind when looking at these results. One, there 
was often a limited number of cases for these judges in dataset B. A lot of states have 
mandatory retirement ages and these judges were getting close to them by the set time 
period. They also may have retired hallway through the dataset, further limiting the cases 
they were involved in. This means that each case has a significantly higher impact on 
their level of deference. Which leads into the second observation, none of these numbers 
are significant after a paired t-test of the data. This is expected because as mentioned 
above, judges all come into court with different perspectives. This mean some are more 
open to deference while others are strongly opposed.  
Although the judges do not mirror the overall trend in the courts, these results do 
support the modified thesis. When looking at the judges that are bolded, all but Barbara 
Keenan have deference levels below the state’s mean. Some even have negative 
deference changes that indicate they were less deferential in 2010-2013 than in 1995-




OSG are less likely to defer to the SG or may not adjust to the new judicial institutions as 
quickly as a new member of the court. 
Hypothesis 3: States will be less deferential if they appoint judges by Missouri Plan, 
Appointment,  Non-Partisan Elections, then Partisan Elections. 
One key distinction between studying the SC versus SHCs is the lack of 
uniformity across courts. An influential example of this is the way the judge is appointed. 
One of the more convenient things about federal judicial deference is that you are dealing 
with one solicitor general, one courts and at most nine justices. However, at the state 
level that courts have a variety of structures that may affect how deferential they 
are. There are four main ways a judge is appointed to a State Supreme Court: a partisan 
election, a non-partisan election, the Missouri Plan, and governor appointment. Partisan 
elections for judges are very similar to that of the other two branches of government. The 
judge will officially announce which party they identify with and they will be backed 
financially and otherwise by the party of choice. This was how nearly all 
judicial elections were run originally. Eventually, the public was wary of an elected 
judiciary and felt that other options might inspire a higher level of judicial legitimacy.    
As of now only the seven states mentioned in the table above still abide by the 
partisan election system to pick judges, however this process may have a significant 
effect on judicial deference. Unlike with the Supreme Court of the United States where 
justices are appointed, an election means that there is a sort of constituency the judge may 
feel obliged to be loyal to. Even partisan elections are meant to be decided based on 




show up to vote have barely researched the President or their own senator. If there is little 
motivation to properly vote for such nationalized positions it is highly unlikely any 
significant group of people researches judges. If a person does vote, it will likely be 
purely off party. Because of this, the judge has an incentive to keep these people happy. 
If they want to be re-elected they need to make sure they stay in people’s good graces. 
Oftentimes, this can mean stay away form scandalous cases or making a very public poor 
vote. This will likely mean that partisan elected judges are less likely to be deferential 
and more likely to vote solely on ideology.   
Non-partisan elections are very similar, though many people felt that elections 
would be more legitimate if the party of a candidate was unknown and they were not 
officially supported. Normally during the election it becomes clear which party the 
candidate aligns with and how they will vote. So in the states below there will be a 
similar effect on deference as there is in partisan elections because the candidate does not 
want to disappoint the voters and lose reelection. A key differences with non partisan 
election is that the parties are not publicly backing a particular judicial candidate 
therefore if the judge wins they do not need to consider pleasing the party organization in 
case or their reelection. 
The third method is probably the closest to the appointment method of the 
Supreme Court. Aptly named the appointment method, the governor will appoint a 
candidate and then some type of assembly must approve it. The only exception to this 
general process is Virginia and South Carolina where they have cut out the middleman 




deference is expected. Any electorate did not put the judge into office, so there only 
concern is that of the governor and the judicial committee. However, there is a 
difference in this process from that of the Supreme Court that will likely be important. 
The Supreme Court appointments are for life. There has been a variety of studies that 
indicate Supreme Court justice tend to drift away from the appointing President’s view 
relatively quickly. There is a low fear of consequences against unpopular Supreme Court 
decisions within the executive or legislative branches. The high level of public trust and 
legitimacy the court has plus their life appointments insulate the justices and allow them 
to be counter majoritarian. State judges do not have such a luxury. Only three states 
appoint judges for life (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island). All of these 
states are part of the appointment process as well, but even these three courts do not have 
the same protection of the Supreme Court. They do have the life terms, but they are not 
as ironclad as the Supreme Court’s are and because lower court decisions can be appealed 
still (even though it is highly unlikely to actually be heard at the Supreme Court) the level 
of public faith and legitimacy of state courts is no way equivalent to that of the Supreme 
Court. Even though for the overwhelming majority of cases the state court is the court of 
last resort; because there is the slim chance that the Supreme Court will select its appeal 
to be one of the few they hear, the public is not as trusting or supportive of state supreme 
court decisions and the judges are therefore not as insulated from executive scrutiny.   
The final system is a bit more complicated that the other, but many states have 
switched over to it. Known as the Missouri Plan because of its origin in Missouri in 1940, 




states, a non-partisan committee is selected to create a shortlist of qualified candidates. 
Then the governor will select one candidate off of the list to actually serve. After a year 
of service, the judge will have a retention vote in the next general election. This method 
is viewed very favorably because it seems to go around partisan bias to most strongly 
consider merit; all while still give the citizens a chance to vote for or against the 
judge. However, the intent behind this method is not always practically successful which 
in turn will likely influence the level of deference the court has. Often times the 
committees that select the candidates are dissolved after selection giving the legislative 
branch the opportunity to hand pick the members before every vote. So, if a state has a 
united government the party in control has a lot of sway to make sure the new judge of 
the same party perspective. Along with this, to fail the retention vote more than 50% of 
voters must actively vote to remove the judge. Given the low turnout for judicial 
elections it is very rare to have a judge not pass the retention vote. A judge would have to 
make a very unpopular, very public decision reasonably close to the end of his first year 
of service to actually be ousted by the vote. Given the low attention the public pays to the 
judiciary in general, this is a very rare occurrence. Because of the practical flaws in this 
system, the level of deference in this system is expected to be relatively high. The judges 
are not appointed for life, so if they want to be re-elected they must appeal themselves to 
the government agencies that will help get them another term.   
The system with which a judge is selected and the considerations they need to 
account for if they want to be re-elected may play a significant role in the level of judicial 




damper on the deference a judge will give the solicitor general; whereas systems like the 
























State	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	 State	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	
Arkansas	 0.606	 NA	 	 Alaska		 0.505	 0.709	 0.204	
Georgia	 NA	 ER	 	 Arizona	 0.048	 0.670	 0.622	
Idaho	 0.371	 0.833	 0.462	 Colorado	 0.035	 0.667	 0.631	
Kentucky	 NA	 ER	 	 Connecticut	 0.318	 ER	 	
Michigan	 0.000	 ER	 	 Florida	 0.273	 0.776	 0.503	
Minnesota	 0.248	 ER	 	 Indiana	 0.593	 0.640	 0.047	
Mississippi	 0.025	 ER	 	 Iowa	 0.676	 ER	 	
Montana	 0.293	 ER	 	 Kansas	 0.230	 ER	 	
Nevada	 0.489	 0.904	 0.415	 Missouri	 0.504	 0.737	 0.233	
North	Dakota	 0.198	 0.848	 0.650	 Nebraska	 0.336	 0.669	 0.332	
Ohio	 0.600	 ER	 	 Oklahoma	 0.528	 0.295	 -0.233	
Oregon	 0.283	 0.545	 0.262	 South	Dakota	 0.344	 NA	 	
Washington	 0.349	 0.647	 0.298	 Utah		 0.451	 0.594	 0.143	
West	Virginia	 0.382	 0.788	 0.406	 Wyoming	 0.845	 0.766	 -0.079	
Wisconsin	 0.389	 0.357	 -0.032	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 Mean	 0.406*	 0.652*	 0.240*	
Mean	 0.389***	 0.703***	 0.351***	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 State	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	
State	 Res	Def.	A	 Res	Def.	B	 Change	 California	 0.333	 0.041	 -0.293	
Alabama	 0.536	 0.500	 -0.036	 Delaware	 0.576	 0.816	 0.241	
Illinois	 0.361	 ER	 	 Hawaii	 NA	 0.493	 	
Louisiana	 0.329	 0.556	 0.227	 Maine	 NA	 ER	 	
New	Mexico	 0.326	 0.468	 0.142	 Maryland	 NA	 ER	 	
North	Carolina	 0.348	 0.778	 0.430	 Massachusetts	 0.497	 ER	 	
Pennsylvania	 0.531	 0.537	 0.006	 New	Hampshire	 0.253	 NA	 	
Texas	 0.453	 0.519	 0.066	 New	Jersey	 0.196	 0.586	 0.389	
	 	 	 	 New	York	 0.148	 ER	 	
Mean	 0.451	 0.559	 0.139	 Rhode	Island	 0.422	 0.884	 0.462	
	 	 	 	 South	Carolina	 0.248	 0.677	 0.430	
	 	 	 	 Tennessee	 0.827	 0.545	 -0.282	
	 	 	 	 Vermont	 0.255	 0.720	 0.464	
	 	 	 	 Virginia	 0.519	 0.726	 0.208	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 Mean	 0.388	 0.610	 0.202	
          Table 8: State deference with Appt. Method 
*** significant at 0.001, ** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05 
 
Table 5: State deference with Non-Partisan Method 
Table 7: State deference with Partisan Method 
 





 There are deference distinctions between the different voting methods when the 
state is the defendant on a case. However, the order is different than expected. Non-
partisan elections have the highest change in deference at 35.1%. Next is the Missouri 
Plan with 24%, then appointments at 20.2% and partisan elections are last with only a 
13.9% deference change. As expected, non-partisan is the least deferential. Partisan 
candidates are expected to side with their party and given the low voter turn out they are 
elected based off party affiliation. Partisan judges have to avoid making a bad ideological 
vote to remain in office, so they are the least likely to be deferential. Having non-partisan 
elections be the most deferential is an interesting development. Though, it does make 
sense. Non-partisan elected judges have no required loyalty to a specific party or 
executive officer. They are free to vote as there are not many expectations on their voting 
pattern except for anything they campaigned on. This gives them the most freedom to be 
deferential. Though they were expected to be more deferential than non-partisan 
elections, Missouri plan and appointment were in the correct order. They are very similar 
processes in which the judge is appointed by a specific candidate but does not have 
strong loyalties required to stay in office. It could also be possible that like with Supreme 
Court justices, appointed judges tend to shift after being appointed (author). This shift 
allows the judges more freedom to be deferential when they desire without heavy 
consequence.  
Conclusion and Future Considerations 
 Overall, many of the hypotheses were at least partial disproved, but not fully. This 




Solicitor General at the state court. As mentioned during the discussion of hypothesis 1, 
perhaps there is a delay in the effect the SG may have. Or maybe the SG was only 
effective if it was established before the nineties and now it is too late to gain that 
advantage. Also noted was that although individual justice were not bound by the same 
trends the overall court is, their voting records may be further support of a delay before 
the SG advantage comes into effect. It would be interesting to look at these same states 
and divisions between them at a later time period to see if category 2 has caught up with 
category 1. Also, then one could look at the states within category 3 that created an OSG 
after 2013 and see if they mirror the results of category 2 in this study.  
Another consideration worth looking into is party identification of the governor 
and the state as a whole. Republicans and conservative tend to have a stricter view of the 
constitution and legal code so it is possible that conservative judges appointed or elected 
by Republicans may be less willing to be deferential. In this case would one still see the 
same general trend in test comparisons, or would they  be weaker for the Republican 
selected judges than they are for the Democrat selected judges. However this could also 
work in the opposite direction, liberals and Democrats are more likely to take a 
evolutionary and progressive stance on the constitution and legal code and often 
the courts are the method used to push for legal reform. For example, the Supreme Court 
case Plessy v Ferguson (1896) was a set up by the Comité des Citoyens in New Orleans 
to appeal the Separate Car Act (1890). They were making no progress in the legislative or 
executive spheres so they set up Homer Plessy to be arrested so they could appeal the 




liberals and Democrat appointed judges are less likely to be deferential because they want 
to be progressive in spite of other branches’ governmental bureaucracy. Ideology often 
plays a key role in court proceedings and it would definitely be enlightening to see if it 
had any impact of deference through the Solicitor General.  
A final possible consideration would be to investigate the content of the cases. 
Perhaps there are certain cases like gender discrimination where judges are far less likely 
to be deferential. This may compare to a case about fiscal concerns where the judiciary is 
more willing to defer to the executive. Maybe those example are the exact opposite of 
what is true. There is still so much that is unknown about the SG’s role in judicial 
deference to the executive branch at the state court level. Though these results indicate 
there is an effect, even if it was exactly what was expected, they in no way 
comprehensively explore the depth and complexity. The relationship between the 
executive and judicial branch is complicated enough, that when one throws in the OSG 
and the nuances that come with states courts there is so much to explore and investigate. 
And all this research is very important. The judiciary is a critical part of the US’s 
democratic system. It holds the responsibility to check both the executive and legislative 
branches. Ensuring that each branch is doing its job properly, not overstepping or 
neglecting its duties, is what helps maintain American democracy. If one branch is failing 
it will disrupt the whole system with disastrous effects. The level of judicial deference to 
the executive branch can range from reasonable deference to agencies with expertise to 
neglectful allowance of the executive agenda. It is highly relevant and consequential to 




executive. Without a proper understanding, there is no way to tell when the phenomena 
has crossed a line from reasonable too dangerous. This paper attempts to start filling the 
massive gap in state court research in a way that with continued investigation and 






Category	1	 Pre	1998	 	 	 	
State	 SGO	Year	 Election	Method	 Exec	Idea	A	 Exec	Idea	B	
Arizona	 1994	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 Republican	
Colorado	 1974	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
Deleware	 1969	 Appt	 Democrat	 Democrat	
Illinios	 1987	 Partisan	 Republican	 Democrat	
Maine	 1997	 Appt	 Independent	 11-D,R	
Michigan	 1939	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 11-D,R	
Minnesota	 1992	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 11-R,	D	
Missouri	 1994	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
New	York	 1981	 Appt	 Republican	 Democrat	
Ohio	 1994	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 11-D,R	
Oregon	 1970	 Non-partisan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
South	Carolina	 1994	 Appt	 Republican	 Republican	
Tennesee	 1990	 Appt	 Republican	 11-D,R	
Utah		 1992	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 Republican	
Vermont	 1994	 Appt	 Democrat	 11-R,	D	
Washington	 1994	 Non-partisan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
 
Category	2	 Between	1998-2013	 	 	
State	 SGO	Year	 Election	Method	 Exec	Idea	A	 Exec	Idea	B	
Alabama	 2003	 Partisan	 Republican	 Republican	
Alaska		 2003	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Republican	
California	 2003	 Appt	 Republican	 11-R,	D	
Connecticut	 2003	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 11-R,	D	
Florida	 1999	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Republican	
Georgia	 2012	 Non-partisan	 Democrat	 Republican	
Hawaii	 2007	 Appt	 Democrat	 10-R,D	
Indiana	 2005	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Republican	
Kansas	 1999	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 11-D,R	
Maryland	 2002	 Appt	 Democrat	 Democrat	
Massachusetts	 2013	 Appt	 Republican	 Democrat	
Montana	 2013	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 Democrat	
Nebraska	 2003	 Missouri	Plan	 Democrat	 Republican	
Nevada	 2008	 Non-partisan	 Democrat	 Republican	
New	Jersey	 1999	 Appt	 Republican	 Republican	
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North	Carolina	 2004	 Partisan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
North	Dakota	 2003	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 Republican	
Oklahoma	 2011	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 11-D,R
Texas	 1999	 Partisan	 Republican	 Republican	
Virginia	 2000	 Appt	 Republican	 Republican	
West	Virginia	 2011	 Non-partisan	 97-D,R Democrat	
Category	3	 After	2013	or	No	OSG	
State	 SGO	Year	 Election	Method	 Exec	Idea	A	 Exec	Idea	B	
Arkansas	 2015	 Non-partisan	 95-D,	R Democrat	
Idaho	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 Republican	
Iowa	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 11-D,R
Kentucky	 2019	 Non-partisan	 Democrat	 Democrat	
Louisiana	 2016	 Partisan	 96-D,R Republican	
Mississippi	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 Republican	
New	
Hampshire	 2018	 Appt	 97-R,	D Democrat	
New	Mexico	 Partisan	 Republican	 11-D,R
Pennsyllvania	 2016	 Partisan	 Republican	 11-D,R
Rhode	Island	 Appt	 Republican	 11-R,	D
South	Dakota	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 Republican	
Wisconsin	 2015	 Non-partisan	 Republican	 11-D,R
Wyoming	 Missouri	Plan	 Republican	 11-D,R
 45 
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